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School Children and Parolees: Not So Special Anymore
Abstract

The Fourth Amendment special needs exception may be one of the Court’s most puzzling doctrines. Since its
origin, the Court has struggled to define its limits and its place in the Court’s suspicionless search and seizure
jurisprudence. At times the Court has suggested that the exception is the only route to upholding a search or
seizure in the absence of individualized suspicion, while at other times it has stated that it is just one of a
limited number of exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion. Historically, while the
application of the special needs exception has been unpredictable, one thing was clear: once the Court found a
“special need,” the search in question was upheld.
More recently, the Court has struck down several suspicionless search schemes because, in the Court’s view,
they were implemented with the primary purpose of ordinary crime control. However, just as some limits
have appeared to rein in suspicionless and/or special needs searches, the Court seems ready to jettison the
exception in favor of what it refers to as “a general Fourth Amendment analysis.”
This Article, written as part of the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law annual Fourth Amendment
symposium on Children and the Fourth Amendment, analyzes the current state of the special needs exception
created in New Jersey v. T.L.O. The Article begins with a detailed discussion of the Court’s suspicionless
search jurisprudence and explains how T.L.O., and specifically Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, shaped the
Court’s jurisprudence. The Article then reviews two recent parolee/probationer cases as well as the Court’s
most recent school search case, Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, and argues that these cases
suggest that after decades of ambiguity, confusion, and even explicit contradiction, the Court appears to have
given up in its attempts to define the special needs exception and instead has turned to the even less well
defined “general Fourth Amendment analysis” to analyze suspicionless searches and seizures. Most troubling,
the Court may have done so as a means to avoid the few limits, particularly the “primary purpose” test,
recently imposed on special needs searches. The Article warns that while civil libertarians used to, and still do,
lament the “standardlessness” and permissiveness of the special needs exception, they may be wishing for the
good old days once they see where the “general Fourth Amendment analysis” path leads.
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SCHOOL CHILDREN AND PAROLEES: NOT
SO SPECIAL ANYMORE
Edwin J Butterfoss*
INTRODUCTION
In his contribution to this symposium, School Searches

Writ Large: Broadening the Perspective in Which We View
School Search Cases, Dean Samuel Davis suggests much can be
learned by attempting to view the school search cases in a larger context as part of the Supreme Court's overall jurisprudence.
That is the goal of this paper: to examine the school search cases through the prism of the Court's suspicionless search and
seizure jurisprudence and, on this twenty-fifth anniversary of
the Court's decision in New Jersey v. TL. O., to explore what
lessons that landmark case and other school search cases can
teach us about the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence,
as well as what some recent non-school suspicionless search
cases tell us about the continuing vitality of those lessons in
and out of schools.
The title of this article reflects one of TL.O.'s contributions to the area of suspicionless searches-the special needs
exception-and tries to capture my contention that the special
needs exception has been eliminated, or may be on the verge of
elimination, in two areas that gave it its genesis: searches of
school children 2 and searches of probationers/parolees.3 In fact,
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. Thank you to Professor
Thomas K. Clancy for the opportunity to participate in this symposium and to Anna
Yunker, a third year law student at Hamline University School of Law for her outstanding research and editorial assistance as well as for her unflagging enthusiasm for
this project.
1 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
2 See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.").
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the exception may have been eliminated entirely from the
Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence in favor of what the
Court calls its "general Fourth Amendment approach." 4
This article first will briefly review the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence. Next the article will explain where
T.L.O. and the school searches fit into that jurisprudence and
explore the lessons to be learned from those cases. Finally, the
article will finish by examining what placing two recent parolee/probationer search cases and the most recent school search
case, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,5 into the
mix means for the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence
and for searches of students. This final part will analyze what
the Court's new "general Fourth Amendment approach" might
mean in the school search setting.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH
JURISPRUDENCE 6

Although the jurisprudence of the Court in the suspicionless search area is muddled and confused,' it starts with a basic and important proposition: the Supreme Court insists that
suspicionless searches are the exception to the rule.8 The Court
3 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (holding that the warrantless
search of a probationer's home was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment "because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers").
4 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
5 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
6 This section of the article draws heavily from a previous article exploring in
more depth the Supreme Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence. See Edwin J.
Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives
the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (2007).
7 See id. at 422 n.23 (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, On The Fourth Amendment
Rights Of The La w-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 88-89 (referring to "doctrinal
incoherence" in this area)).
- See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)
("[A] search must be supported, as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable
cause."); id. at 667 ("Even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in the particular circumstances, a search ordinarily must be based on probable
cause.").
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has repeatedly stated as a basic tenet of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that "[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."9 Of course, that is the ordinary or general rule. The
Court has also expressly stated that "such suspicion is not an
'irreducible' component of reasonableness."10 Nevertheless, the
Court has emphasized that permissible suspicionless searches
fall within a "closely guarded category,"" suggesting very few,
limited exceptions to the general rule requiring individualized
suspicion. The obvious question is what types of searches are
within this "closely guarded category" of permissible suspicionless searches? That question is surprisingly difficult to answer.
A. The StartingPoint
The Supreme Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence
begins with Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco.12 In
Camara, the lessee of an apartment refused to permit a housing inspector to enter his apartment without a warrant and
was criminally charged with "refusing to permit a lawful inspection."13 Under the prevailing law, an inspection such as the
one in question was not considered a search.14 In Camara, the
Court overruled the existing precedent and found the inspection to be a search governed by the Fourth Amendment, including the warrant requirement.1 Since the Fourth Amendment is
clear that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,"16
and because probable cause had always been understood to re-

9 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560
(1976). On at least two occasions, the Court has struck down a suspicionless search
scheme because it did not "fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches." Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77
(2001); see also Chandler,520 U.S. at 309.
10 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561).
" Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77; see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
12 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
1s Id. at 527.
14 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
15 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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quire some level of individualized suspicion,' 7 the Court was
forced to redefine probable cause in order to authorize warrants to carry out routine administrative inspections that were
not premised on the existence of individualized suspicion of
code violations.' 8 It did so by equating probable cause with
"reasonableness" and creating a balancing test to determine
reasonableness, declaring that, "there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails."1 9 By
utilizing a balancing test, the Court eliminated any requirement of a minimum quantum of individual suspicion and
opened the door to suspicionless searches and seizures. 20
After Camara, there were two ways to assess the constitutionality of a search: the warrant approach and the reasonableness approach. 2 1 Under the warrant approach, all searches
without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless they fall
within one of the "few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions." 22 Moreover, those exceptions generally
forgive the requirement of a warrant, not the requirement of
probable cause (defined as a quantum of individualized suspicion) to support the search. 23 Under the reasonableness apSee supra text accompanying note 9.
U.S. at 535-36.
19 Id. at 536-37.
20 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 230, 231 (4th ed. 2004); Scott E.
Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He is Quiet"- Suspicionless Searches, 'Special
Needs" and General Warrants, 74 MISS. LA. 501, 550 (2004).
21 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
17

18 Camara, 387

REV. 1468, 1471 (1985) (stating that there are two models of the Fourth Amendment:
the reasonableness approach and the warrant approach); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright
Line Breaking Point. EmbracingJustice Scalia's Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82

TUL. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004) ("The issue of whether searches and seizures ... should be
governed by a per se rule based on the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment or a
more general rule of reasonableness based on the Reasonableness Clause of that
Amendment has plagued the United States Supreme Court for decades.").
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
23 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that a warrantless search of an automobile is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment
provided the searching officer has probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that an officer may search a
container in a vehicle without a warrant provided the officer has probable cause to
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proach of Camara, by contrast, the question of whether a
search is constitutional is determined through a balancing
test.2 4 A search is reasonable if the interests of the government
in carrying out the search outweigh the "costs" to the citizen of
being subjected to the search in terms of the intrusion upon the
citizen's privacy or liberty.2 5 Individualized suspicion is not
necessarily required. 26
The question for government officials seeking to utilize
this new tool was how to qualify to have their actions tested by
the balancing test. What justifies using the balancing test rather than the traditional "per se warrant approach"? It is important to keep in mind that the government had a significant
incentive to have their actions judged by the balancing test.
That test could forgive a warrant, probable cause, and even
individualized suspicion. A simple answer to the question of
when the use of the balancing test was justified or permitted
was not immediately forthcoming from the Court, but there
were hints.
In Camara, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the
search in question was an administrative search, not a search
seeking evidence of crime. 27 As a result, Camara was viewed as
having created an administrative search exception that permitted suspicionless searches. 28 Although the first case to utilize
the reasonableness approach and balancing test was Terry v.
Ohio, a case involving a search seeking evidence of criminal
activity, 29 searches without individualized suspicion were
viewed as being justified only in the administrative search set-

believe the container contains contraband even if the officer does not have probable
cause as to the whole vehicle); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, officers may search the arrestee's person and the
area within the arrestee's immediate control without a warrant); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that a police officer may enter a home and search without
a warrant when the exigencies of the situation demand it).
24
Camara, 587 U.S. at 536-37.
25
26

Id.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, at 213; Sundby, supra note 20, at 550.

27

Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-38.

28

See Butterfoss, supra note 6, at 432 n.75.

29

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ting.30 This notion was reinforced in a group of early cases in
which the Court upheld suspicionless searches in the form of
statutory inspection programs easily classified as administrative searches of the type at issue in Camara, including inspections of gun dealers, 31 liquor distributors, 32 and similar businesses. 33 However, the balancing test was also used in situations beyond typical administrative inspections.
B. The Early Cases
One of the first cases in which the Court utilized the balancing test to uphold a search outside the context of an administrative search was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,an immigration checkpoint case. 34 To attempt to stem the flow of
immigrants crossing the border illegally, the government instituted a program of roving patrols and checkpoints. 35 When
each of these tactics was challenged, the government sought to
justify the actions undertaken by Border Patrol agents without
individualized suspicion by analogizing to the administrative
search cases and arguing the government actions were more
like administrative searches (subject to the balancing test)
than the typical automobile searches for criminal activity, 36

3o See, e.g., Peter S. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61

CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1015-16 (1973) (describing the Camara individualized suspicion

standard as "far too loose to be applied in the criminal search context"); Brief for Respondent at 14, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543 (1976) (No. 74-1560)
("The petitioner's proposed analogy to administrative inspection cases is inapplicable
and does not justify the emasculation. . . of the reasonable suspicion standard for vehicular stops announced in Brignoni-Ponce.").
31 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (holding that a warrantless search
of a gun dealer's locked storeroom during business hours did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
32 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (holding that, in
the absence of congressional authorization, forcible entry to perform an administrative
search without a warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
n See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967) ("Camara applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences.").
3 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
35 Id. at 552.
36 See id. at 560-62.
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which were subject to the warrant approach and required
probable cause. 3 7
In the cases involving searches of automobiles by roving
patrols and at checkpoints, the Court rejected the analogy to
administrative searches because the officers had largely unfettered discretion to exercise their authority: "The search [in this
case] thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara
when it insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field'
be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection." 38 When the government intrusion was limited to a seizure at a permanent checkpoint where every car was momentarily detained, the Court held the government activity constitutional. 39 But the Court did not reach this different result because it accepted the analogy to the administrative search cases. The Court emphasized that "[t]he fact that the purpose of
such laws is said to be administrative is of limited relevance in
weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel."40 And the
Court repeatedly referred to the checkpoints as being for "law
enforcement purposes." 4 1 The new result was based on the
more limited intrusion imposed by the checkpoints-whether
for administrative purposes or law enforcement purposes-and
the limits on the discretion of the officer in the field.42
Despite these immigration cases where the Court seemed
to uphold suspicionless searches outside the administrative
3 Under the automobile exception, only probable cause, but not a warrant, was
required. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
38 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (quoting Camara v.
Mun. Court of S.F., 587 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (stating that "[m]oreover we are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the officer's discretion to select cars for search").
39 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59.
40 Id. at 560n.14.
41 The first sentence of the opinion states, "These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens." Id. at 545.
The Court also stated, "Interdicting the flow of illegal [aliens] poses formidable law
enforcement problems." Id. at 552. The Court also noted that "the needs of law enforcement are furthered by this location." Id. at 562 n.15. And, in upholding the "secondary inspection" of a limited number of cars, the Court stated that reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry "clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served."
Id. at 564 n.17.
42 Id. at 557-60.
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context, the idea that the exception permitting suspicionless
searches was for administrative searches persisted, in large
part because that distinction-administrative purpose versus
law enforcement purpose-was emphasized in another set of
cases where the requirement of individualized suspicion was
forgiven: inventory searches.
The distinction between a search with an administrative
purpose and a law enforcement purpose was especially emphasized in South Dakota v. Opperman, a case involving the
search of an automobile towed because it was parked in violation of parking regulations. 43 In justifying the use of the balancing test to assess the constitutionality of the search, the
Court noted, "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures." 44 The Court also explained, "The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective procedures are
a subterfuge for criminal investigations." 45 Although the Court
has always treated inventory cases as a separate category of
permissible suspicionless searches, 46 this language encouraged
the notion that suspicionless searches were permissible only in
the noncriminal, administrative setting.47 But then along came

TL.O.

43

428 U.S. 364 (1976).

44

Id. at 370n.5.

45

Id.

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.01[B], at 266
(3d ed. 2002) (characterizing inventory searches as a separate category and explaining
this resulted "largely for historical reasons"): Butterfoss, supra note 6, at 442 ("For
reasons that are not apparent, the Court has treated inventory searches as a separate
category of intrusion unrelated to the 'closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches and seizures' spawned by Camara." (citation omitted)).
47 See also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (stating that "as in Opperman . . . there was no showing that the police . . . acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation").
46
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C. New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the Expansion of the
"ConstitutionallyPermissibleSuspicionless Search" Category
Along with Camara, TL.O. is one of the seminal cases in
the Supreme Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence. It is
particularly curious how TL.0. came to occupy that status given that it was not a suspicionless search case-the vice principal in the case had reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was violating school rules.48 And TL.O. also does not seem to fit the
administrative search category. The search was not part of a
program of inspections (for instance, a locker inspection); it was
an ad hoc decision by a school official based on a report of a
possible violation of school rules. 49 Nevertheless, the decision in
TL.O. seemed to provide a definition of the "category" of permissible suspicionless searches to which the Court had been
referring and to lay the groundwork for a broad expansion of
that category.50

48

4

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328, 345-47 (1985).
Id. at 328.

so See id. at 340-41. In determining that the search of T.L.O. was reasonable, the
Court referenced several suspicionless search cases, suggesting a unified category:
Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when
"the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search," we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.
The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search-even
one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant-must be based
upon "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.
However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search.
The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and
seizures be reasonable, and although "both the concept of probable cause and
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in
certain limited circumstances neither is required." Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of probable cause.
Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to
adopt such a standard.
Id. at 340-41 (internal citations omitted).
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In TL.0., the Court upheld a search of a student's purse
by school authorities without a warrant and without probable
cause.5 1 In his majority opinion, without any explanation, as if
it were the general rule, Justice White proceeded directly to a
balancing test as the appropriate test for assessing government
conduct subject to the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions. 5 2 He
baldly stated: "The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.'"53I f, as suggested by the majority's approach,
the balancing test is the general rule, individualized suspicion
could be forgiven by utilizing that test for virtually any search
or seizure, not just administrative searches.
In the case before it, the Court struck the balance by requiring individualized suspicion. The Court held that a search
of a student by a teacher or other school official was justified
when "there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school." 54 But the
Court elaborated in a footnote that it was not deciding whether
"individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities."55 This reaffirmation that the balancing test could, in appropriate circumstances, authorize suspicionless searches,
combined with Justice White's statement that the balancing
test provided the appropriate analysis for assessing any Fourth
Amendment conduct by the government, provided the basis for
a broad expansion of the use of the balancing test and, by extension, the suspicionless search category. 56
Justice Blackmun recognized the door had been opened to
an expanded use of the reasonableness approach and tried to

51 Id at 341.
52 Idat 337.

Id (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
Id at 342.
r5 Id at 342 n.8.
56 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On The Fourth Amendment Rights Of The LawAbiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 100.
5:
54
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limit the expansion of the suspicionless search category.57 In
his concurring opinion, he asserted that the majority had
"omit[ted] a crucial step" in freeing the government from the
warrant approach.58 He explained that the Court had used, and
should only continue to use, the balancing test-the route to
suspicionless searches-when confronted by "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."59 Specifically, he stated,
"Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers."60
Justice Blackmun's "special needs" rubric was applied
once by a plurality of the Court in a case with similarities to a
school search-a search of a government worker's desk for evidence related to work misconduct 61-before being adopted by a
majority of the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin, a case which featured a search of a probationer's home based on reasonable
suspicion. 62 In Griffin, after stating the rule that a search
"usually" requires a warrant and probable cause, the Court
stated that it had permitted exceptions to the rule "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 63
57

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).

58 Id.

59 Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
61 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987). Surprisingly, Justice Blackmun dissented in Ortega. However, his disagreement was not with the special needs
rubric itself, but with, what he perceived as, the plurality's misapplication of it: "Because there was no 'special need' to dispense with the warrant and probable-cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I would evaluate the search by applying this
traditional standard." Id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
62 483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987).
1 Id. at 873 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Although we usually require that
a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by probable
cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), we have permitted exceptions when
'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable."') (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring in judgment (internal citation omitted))).
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The Court noted instances in which it had found "special
needs"-O'Connor v. Ortega (the office search case) and
T.L.O.-and referred to various administrative searches as an
example where "for similar reasons" the usual rule had been
forgiven. 64
But after referring to administrative searches as similar
to, but apparently separate from, special needs, the Court
seemed to bring them within the special needs category when it
concluded, "A State's operation of a probation system, like its
operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs'
beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."65
That language suggested the Court was consolidating its "balancing test" cases under the rubric of "special needs." Reinforcing this idea was language in a case decided two weeks earlier,
New York v. Burger, which involved a suspicionless inspection
of an auto junkyard. 66 In this seemingly classic administrative
search case, the Court characterized the search as a special
needs search and justified permitting a suspicionless search
because "as in other cases of 'special need' . . . a warrantless

inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."67
At this point, courts and commentators were confused
about when the balancing test could be used. Some thought
there were two exceptions: the special needs exception and the
administrative search exception.68 Others thought there was
64

Id.

65

Id. at 873-74.

66 482 U.S. 691
67 Id. at 702.

(1987).

6s See, e.g, Michael R. Beeman, Note, Investigating Child Abuse: The Fourth
Amendment and Investigatory Home Visits, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1034, 1048-49 (1989)
(noting that special needs searches can be distinguished from administrative searches
and criminal searches); The Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court,
1988 Term: Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 137, 269, 275 (1989) (explaining that
"the Court constructed three tests to determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure": the warrant and probable cause requirements for searches in the criminal context; the reasonable suspicion requirement for searches in "exceptional circumstances,"
i.e., special needs searches; and no requirement of individualized suspicion for adminis-

2011]

School Children and Parolees

817

one exception-special needs-which included administrative
searches and other types of searches. 69 But at this point, no one
was suggesting that the balancing test was the general rule for
analyzing searches. And whether it was the exception or just
merely one of several exceptions, there now clearly was an incentive for government officials to argue a particular search
scheme was justified by "a special need beyond the normal need
for law enforcement." And that is just what the government
did.
D. The Rise of the 'Special Needs" Exception
In a series of cases involving drug testing of school children and others in the late 1980s through the 1990s, the government urged the Court to uphold the search schemes as justified by special needs, and the Court embraced the exception. 70
In each case, the Court emphasized that searches generally
needed to be supported by a warrant and probable cause, but
relied on special needs as the justification for departing from
the general rule and utilizing the balancing test.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, a
case challenging the suspicionless drug testing of railroad

trative searches); Ronald F. Wright, Note, The Civil and CriminalMethodologies of the
Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1144 n.84 (1984) ("Administrative searches
occupy their own exception to the warrant requirement.").
69 See, e.g., Captain Jeffrey D. Smith, Administrative Inspections in the Armed
ForcesAfter New York v. Burger, 1988 ARMY LAW. 9, 9 ("Administrative [searches] are

authorized in a variety of situations and are justified when 'special need[], beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impractica [ble]."').
70 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that school policy requiring all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities submit to
drug testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that random, suspicionless drug testing of school athletes
does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding that suspicionless and warrantless drug testing of Customs Agents is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment due to special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 634 (1989) (holding that alcohol and drug tests of railway workers are reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "[even] in the absence of a warrant or
reasonable suspicion," because "any particular employee may be impaired").
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the Court acknowledged that "[e]xcept in certain

well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not rea-

sonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause." 72 But the Court went on to
explain that it had "recognized exceptions to this rule . . . 'when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."" 73 Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, the companion case to Skinner involving drug testing of Customs Department employees, 74 the Court again acknowledged the general rule requiring a warrant and probable
cause (or some other level of individual suspicion), but asserted
that its cases "establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement," the Court may balance the interests
de novo to determine whether a warrant or individual suspicion is required.75
The fact that the Court did not hedge its statements by
characterizing special needs as simply one of many instances in
which the Court had recognized an exception and freely cited to
inventory cases,76 traffic checkpoint cases, and administrative
search cases78 as if all were within the umbrella of the special
needs exception, suggested it had found a unifying principle for
its suspicionless search jurisprudence.79 Similarly, in assessing
the drug testing scheme of student athletes in Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton,80 the Court again referred to the special
489 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 619.
13 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
74 489 U.S. at 659.
75 Id. at 665.
76 Id at 667-68 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) and Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search cases)).
71 Id at 665, 668, 672, 674 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 482 U.S. 543
(1976) (traffic checkpoint case)).
78 Id at 665-66, 668, 671 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), an administrative search case); id at 668, 674-75 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative search case)).
7
See id. at 665-68.
71
72

so 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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needs doctrine seemingly as the route to qualifying for an exception to the requirement of individualized suspicion when it
stated that "a warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches,"8 1 and explained that a
search unsupported by probable cause could be justified "when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant probable-cause requirement impracticable."82
The Court's rhetoric in these cases seemed to convince
commentators that the special needs exception was the gateway to being able to utilize the balancing test (and possibly justify a suspicionless search).83 But there were also hints from
the Court that the special needs exception was not the single
category of permissible suspicionless searches. In the midst of
deciding the drug testing cases, the Court revisited traffic

checkpoints in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, a
civil case challenging a highway sobriety checkpoint program
instituted by the Michigan State Police.8 4 The plaintiffs argued
the balancing test was not the proper method of analysis to
decide the case, relying on Von Raab to argue that unless the
government demonstrated a special need "'beyond the normal
need' for criminal law enforcement," probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required and a balancing analysis was inappropriate.8 5 Rather than finding or even suggesting that such
a special need was present, which seemed rather easy to do,

e8 Id at 653.
82

Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).

83

See Butterfoss, supra note 6, at 458-59 nn.207 & 211.

The Court currently has developed a framework that consists of two steps.
First, it decides whether to analyze an intrusion under the Warrant or Reasonableness Clause. The Court has struggled to find the proper fulcrum between the two clauses, but currently asks whether a "special governmental
need" exists that justifies departure from the Warrant Clause.
Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1796 (1994); see also DRESSLER,
supra note 46, at § 19.01, at 324 ("[The] 'special needs' exception . . . can plausibly
subsume the [administrative search and traffic checkpoint] categories of cases.").
8 496 U.S. 444
85 Id. at 450.

(1990).

8 20

MISSISSIPPILA W JOURNAL

[VOL. 80: 3

Justice Rehnquist provided a curt and cryptic response to the
argument:
But it is perfectly plain from a reading of Von Raab,
which cited and discussed with approval our earlier [traffic
checkpoint] decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, that
it was in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing
with police stops of motorists on public highways. MartinezFuerte, which utilized a balancing analysis in approving
highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens, and Brown v.
Texas are the relevant authorities here. 86
That is a particularly worrisome statement by Justice
Rehnquist. Because it would have been so easy to find a special
need in Sitz-highway safety-one wonders what his purpose
was in avoiding the special needs framework. Despite all the
language in the drug testing cases, and the citations to and
reliance on non-drug testing cases (including traffic checkpoints) as if all within the same "special needs" exception or
category, this statement seems to suggest separate categories.
In later cases, it is again unclear from the Court's language whether "special needs" was the label for the "closely
guarded category of permissible suspicionless searches" or
whether it was just one of a number of exceptions under which
suspicionless searches were permissible.8 7 Despite the confu86 Id. (internal citations omitted).
87 Perhaps the most detailed effort to present a unified suspicionless search and
seizure jurisprudence came from Justice Ginsburg in her opinion for the Court in
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), a case involving drug testing of candidates for
state-wide office in Georgia and the first case in which the Court struck down a government scheme of suspicionless searches. After explaining that the Fourth Amendment "generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion," Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that searches conducted without individualized suspicion had been upheld "in certain limited circumstances." Id. at 308
(emphasis added) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989)). She did not explicitly state how "certain limited circumstances" related to the
"closely guarded category" and to "special needs,"' but she referenced the full spectrum
of suspicionless searches the Court had upheld--drug testing of workers, immigration
and sobriety checkpoints, and "administrative inspections in closely regulated businesses"-before explaining the Court was striking down the Georgia scheme because it
"does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." Id. at 308-09. She initially did not mention "special needs." Howev-
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sion about whether there was a single category labeled "special
needs" or whether several categories existed, the important
point is that in every case the Court reaffirmed the basic principle that suspicionless searches are permissible only in limited
88 For instance, in City of Indianapolis v. Edcircumstances.

mond, a case involving a traffic checkpoint utilizing drug sniffing dogs to detect drug smugglers, 89 Justice O'Connor reiterated the rule that "[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing," 90 and then stated: "[W]e have recognized only limited
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply."9 1 Ed-

er, later in her opinion, as she began her analysis of the issues, she reiterated that
"particularized exceptions to the main rule [of individualized suspicion] are sometimes
warranted based on 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."' Id.
at 313-14 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). It
is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg was using "special needs" interchangeably with
the "limited circumstances" she had referred to earlier in her opinion.
In analyzing the drug-testing scheme before the Court, Justice Ginsburg relied
exclusively on the special needs exception. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317-18 ("Our guides
remain Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia."). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted this attempt at a unifying theme in his dissent: 'Today's opinion speaks of a 'closely guarded'
class of permissible suspicionless searches [and seizures] which must be justified by a
'special need."' Id. at 325. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He didn't agree or disagree
with the notion of a single category or class; he disagreed with the meaning the Court
gave to "special needs" as a demonstrated problem versus simply a government interest. See id.
88 Eg., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) ("[A]though 'both the concept
of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a
search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required."' (quoting New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 489 U.S. 325, 340 (1985))); see United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 853
(9th Cir. 2004) ("And whether one attempts to manufacture neat categories with clever
names or groups them all into one large category of cases involving 'special needs,' the
overriding lesson is clear: when the government wishes to search individuals in order
to obtain evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, some level of individualized suspicion is required.") (internal citations omitted).
89 531 U.S. 32, 34-35 (2000).
9 Id. at 37.
91 Id. As examples, Justice O'Connor specified "certain regimes of suspicionless
searches where the program was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement"'; appropriately limited searches for "certain administrative
purposes"; and brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints and at sobriety checkpoints. Id. (internal citations omitted). Unlike Justice
Ginsburg, who listed several "limited circumstances" (not including special needs) and
then seemed to label the group as "special needs," Justice O'Connor demoted special
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mond is best known for imposing a "primary purpose" test for
roadblocks-their primary purpose cannot be "ordinary crime
control"92-but for our purposes, the case is important because
whether or not the "limited circumstances" to which it refers
are all within one exception (special needs) or special needs is
just one of the limited circumstances, the point remains: suspicionless searches are permissible only in limited circumstances.
This basic principle was reaffirmed in a later case, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a case involving drug testing of pregnant women receiving prenatal care at a public hospital. 93 Ferguson continued the confusion between the "special needs as
the label for limited circumstances" versus "special needs as
one of the limited circumstances" by referring first to the
"closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,"94 and later to the "closely guarded category
of special needs." 95 Again, however, despite the confusion, Ferguson reaffirms the basic principle that suspicionless searches
96
are permissible only in limited circumstances.
In light of the Court's consistent reaffirmation of the basic
principle that suspicionless searches are permissible only in
limited circumstances, it was rather shocking when the Court
decided a pair of cases involving searches of probationers and
parolees and declared that, contrary to all its prior declarations, suspicionless searches are in fact permissible not only in

needs to one of the limited circumstances, seemingly substituting special needs for the
drug testing cases included by Justice Ginsburg.
92 Id. at 44.
93 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
19 Id. at 77 ("[T]his case differs from the four previous cases in which we have considered whether comparable drug tests 'fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."' (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 309 (1997))).
95 Id. at 84 ("[T]his case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of
'special needs."').
96 And I would argue, those limited circumstances at this point had been pretty
well defined by the Court, as expressed by Justice O'Connor: special needs (drug testing, school searches, probation searches); appropriately limited administrative
searches; and brief traffic checkpoints with a primary purpose other than ordinary
crime control.
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limited circumstances or when justified by a special need, but
as a matter of "general Fourth Amendment principles."
II. NOT So SPECIAL ANYMORE?
The first of the two probationer/parolee cases where the
Court suggested a dramatic change in its suspicionless search
jurisprudence was United States v. Knights.97 Knights involved
a warrantless search of a probationer's home. 98 It was not a
"probation search" in the sense that it was to ensure compliance with conditions of probation. Rather, the searching officer was investigating several incidents of property damage to
utility company property. 99 The officer investigated the property damage incidents in typical fashion including surveillance
that practically confirmed the defendant's involvement, but
thought a search of the defendant's home would be useful to his
investigation.100 Aware of the probation condition, the officer
searched the home based on what all parties assumed was reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, and without a warrant.10 ' In essence, the officer's search was a typical search for
evidence of a crime that took advantage of the probation condition, a fact the lower court relied on to rule the search illegal.102
Even if the search could qualify as a "special needs" exception
search, it seems vulnerable to a challenge because it was for
"purposes of ordinary crime control," a purpose which the Court
had deemed unlawful in Edmond.03
It is worth remembering at this point that the original
special needs case-the case in which a majority of the Court
9

534 U.S. 112 (2001).

98 Id. at
99 Id at
100 Id.at
101 Id. at

115.
114-15.
115.
115-16.

10 Id. at 116. The district court granted Knights's motion to suppress "on the
ground that the search was . . . 'investigatory' rather than 'probationary."' Id. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
103 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining that, in Edmond, the Court
held that when the primary purpose is ordinary crime control, roadblocks do not fall
within the special needs exception and thus violate the Fourth Amendment in the
absence of another recognized exception).
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adopted Justice Blackmun's terminology for the first time-was
Griffin v. Wisconsin, which involved the search of a probationer's home. 104 In light of that fact, the defendant's argument, as
described by Justice Rehnquist, that "a warrantless search of a
probationer satisfies the Fourth Amendment only if it is just
like the search at issue in Griffi-i.e., a 'special needs' search
conducted by a probation officer monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions," seems fairly
persuasive.105 But it failed to persuade Justice Rehnquist:
This dubious logic-that an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a particular search implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin's
express statement that its "special needs" holding made it
"unnecessary to consider whether" warrantless searches of
probationers were otherwise reasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.o106
Not only did Justice Rehnquist refuse to analyze the
search as a special needs case, he also felt it unnecessary to
decide whether Knights's consent to the probation conditions
authorized the search.10 7 In Justice Rehnquist's view (for a unanimous court no less) any special needs or consent analysis
was unnecessary "because we conclude that the search of
Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment
approach of 'examining the totality of the circumstances,' with
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance."10 8
The immediate impact on the case before the Court was
that the officer's purpose became irrelevant and was no longer

104See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (explaining that a majority of the
Court adopted Justice Blackmun's "special needs" rubric in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S 868 (1987)).
105 Knights, 534 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 117-18 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878, 880).
Id. at 118 ("We need not decide whether Knights'[s] acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his
106
107

Fourth Amendment rights, however, because we conclude that the search of Knights
was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of 'examining the
totality of the circumstances' with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance." (internal citation omitted)).
11s Id. (internal citation omitted).
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an obstacle to the constitutionality of the search. As Justice
Rehnquist explained:
Because our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a
search, there is no basis for examining official purpose. With
the limited exception of some special needs and administrative search cases, "we have been unwilling to entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers."109
But the larger impact of the Court's adoption of its "general Fourth Amendment approach" to assess the search scheme
at issue in Knights is to broaden considerably the individuals
and groups that may be subjected to suspicionless searches.1 0
Apparently ordinary citizens no longer can lay claim to the
general rule requiring individualized suspicion unless the
search falls within a closely guarded category or certain limited
circumstances. "Ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis" apparently can justify suspicionless searches."' Of course, while ordinary citizens may be subjected to the same analysis, that
does not mean the result will be the same. A "salient feature"
(to use the Court's words) is missing: ordinary citizens are not
on probation.112 And being subject to probation conditions was
a very salient circumstance under the "totality of the circumstances" according to the Court.113 The Court held that the pro109 Id. at 122 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)) (citing City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000)).
110 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhart, J., dissenting).
nMAdmittedly, the search at issue in Knights was not a suspicionless search, but
that provides little comfort. First, the scheme under which the search was authorized
by the State also permitted suspicionless searches, and second, the search in T.L. 0.
was based on reasonable suspicion, but soon led to suspicionless search schemes being
upheld in schools utilizing the same analysis the Court used to justify the search at
issue in T.L.O.
112 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 835-36 (adopting the "ordinary Fourth Amendment totality
of the circumstances" approach for convicted felons subject to DNA testing, but suggesting that the "general citizenry" would be treated differently).
113 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21 (noting that the fact that probationers are "more
likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law" strengthens the State's general
interest in "apprehending violators of the criminal law" in this case (citation omitted)).
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bation conditions "significantly diminished Knights'[s] reasonable expectation of privacy."114 It expressly reserved the question whether the probation condition "so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights'[s] reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer without any

individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment," 115 but one does
not have to be much of a cynic to believe such a holding was not
far behind. Recall the Court's caution in TL.O. that "[w]e do
not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential
element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches
by school authorities."116 The answer, that individualized suspicion was not an essential element for searches by school authorities, was not long in coming." 7 Nor was it long in coming
in the probationer/parolee case." 8
Five years after Knights, the Court decided Samson v. California, a case involving the suspicionless search of a parolee on
the street.119 In Samson, the officer stopped the defendant because he thought Samson was subject to an outstanding warrant.120 When that information proved incorrect, the officer
searched him anyway because he was aware Samson was on
parole and subject to parole conditions.121 Justice Thomas
started his analysis in the case by stating, "[U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach' we 'examin[e] the totality of
114

Id. at 120.

11

Id. at 120 n.6.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (explaining that
while the school search approved in TL.0. was based on individualized suspicion, the
116
117

TL.O. Court also "explicitly acknowledged" that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion" (quoting TL. O., 469 U.S. at 342)). In fact,
not only did the Court determine that suspicionless searches in schools were acceptable, but Justice Scalia asserted that "testing based on 'suspicion' of drug use would not
be better, but worse." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-64.
118 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006) (holding that a suspicionless
search of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 829 (9th Cir. 2004) (predicting that the application of Knights

would not be limited to searches supported by individualized suspicion).
119
120
121

Samson, 547 U.S. at 846-47.
Id at 846.
Id at 846-47.
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the circumstances' to determine whether a search is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."122 He explained, "Whether a search is reasonable 'is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' 123 Relying again on the salient circumstance of parole
(which presents a lower expectation of privacy than even probation according to the Court 24), the Court held, "Examining
the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner's status as a parolee, 'an established variation on imprisonment,'
including the plain terms of the parole search condition, we
conclude that petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy
that society would recognize as legitimate."125 There was some
debate among the Justices whether that statement meant the
Court had found that parolees-like prisoners-have no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no Fourth
Amendment rights.1 26 But for our purposes, the more important debate was the one concerning whether the Court could
uphold a suspicionless search using "ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis" or whether it was required to find a special
need and utilize the special needs exception analysis.127
In dissent, Justice Stevens insisted a finding of special
need was required:
[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the
conclusion, reached by the Court here for the first time, that a

122 Id. at 848 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118 (2001)).
123 Id (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19).
124 Id at 850.
125 Id at 852 (internal citation omitted).
126 Id at 850 n.2 ("Nor, as the dissent suggests, do we equate parolees with prisoners for the purpose of concluding that parolees, like prisoners, have no Fourth Amendment rights."); id. at 861-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The Court two-steps its way
through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the application of Fourth Amendment
principles altogether. The logic apparently is this: Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like prisoners; therefore, parolees have no legitimate
expectation of privacy.").
127 See infra text accompanying notes 128-37.
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search supported by neither individualized suspicion nor
"special needs" is nonetheless "reasonable."
. . . While individualized suspicion "is not an 'irreducible'

component of reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment,
the requirement has been dispensed with only when programmatic searches were required to meet a "'special need' . .
. divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement."128
And later in his opinion he declared, "Never before have we
plunged below that floor absent a demonstration of 'special
9

needs.""12

Perhaps more important than whether the Court had
abandoned its established approach to suspicionless searches
was what was lost by not analyzing the case as a special needs
case. Justice Stevens explained:
In special needs cases we have at least insisted upon programmatic safeguards designed to ensure evenhandedness in
application; if individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it
must be replaced with measures to protect against the state
actor's unfettered discretion. Here, by contrast, there are no
policies in place-no "standards, guidelines, or procedures,"to rein in officers and furnish a bulwark against the arbitrary
exercise of discretion that is the height of unreasonableness.130
Justice Stevens believed the requirement that the search
not be for purposes of ordinary crime control made the search
in Samson illegal, and he further believed that was the precise
reason the majority avoided utilizing the special needs exception:

128 Samson, 547 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001)).
129 Id. at 864.
130 Id. at 860-61 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 650 (1979)) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)).
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Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify the
search of petitioner on "special needs" grounds. . . . Griffin, af-

ter all, involved a search by a probation officer that was supported by reasonable suspicion. The special role of probation
officers was critical to the analysis ....
It is no accident, then, that when we later [in Knights]
upheld the search of a probationer by a law enforcement officer (again, based on reasonable suspicion), we forwent any reliance on the special needs doctrine. 131
Justice Thomas responded to Justice Stevens's claim that
the Court had broken new ground:
That simply is not the case.

. .

. [W]hile this Court's jurispru-

dence has often recognized that "to accommodate public and
private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,"
we have also recognized that the "Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Therefore,
although this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless
searches in limited circumstances, namely, programmatic and
special needs searches, we have never held that these are the
only limited circumstances in which searches absent individualized suspicion could be "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.132

The last statement by Justice Thomas seems a bit disingenuous. Although it is fair to say that when the Court says
such searches are permissible only in limited circumstancesthe
Court is free to add additional categories or circumstances, the
statement certainly suggests that the route required to uphold
new types of suspicionless searches is to add to the limited categories, not to simply abandon the "limited circumstances" rule
and permit such searches under "general Fourth Amendment"
analysis.
The likely result of the Court's shift to "general Fourth
Amendment analysis" in suspicionless search cases is a much
131
132

Id. at 858-60.
Id. at 855 n.4 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).

MISSISSIPPI LA WJOURNAL

830

[VOL. 80: 3

less constrained "balancing test" approach.133 There will be less
concern for whether "measures to protect against the state actor's unfettered discretion" are in place (which the dissent
claims is an indispensable requirement of "special needs"
searches),134 and there will be no restriction against the primary purpose of the search being for law enforcement purposes.
Justice Thomas believed "California's prohibition on 'arbitrary,
capricious, or harassing' searches" addressed the first concern.135 But the search of Samson seems pretty arbitrary. Samson was stopped and searched on the authority of an outstanding warrant, a warrant the officer discovered did not exist, but
the officer searched him anyway.136 Justice Thomas explained
that "[u]nder California precedent, we note, an officer would
not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent
knowledge that the person stopped for the search is a parolee." 137 Of course, the lawfulness of a search of someone not on
parol is not the issue; the issue is whether a search of a parolee
is arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. Justice Thomas's opinion
suggests a remarkably "hands off' approach to suspicionless
searches, an activity that used to be considered an extraordinary action by government officials. Attempting to discern
what this shift in the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence means for children and the Fourth Amendment brings us
to Safford Unified School District#1 v. Redding.138

133 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhart, J., dissenting) ("The danger in the plurality's approach lies in its willingness to apply the
totality of the circumstances test to uphold law enforcement searches where no suspicion at all exists. Under such an approach, all of us would inevitably have our liberty
eroded when our privacy interests are balanced against the "monumental" interests of
law enforcement.").
134 Samson, 547 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 856.
136

Id. at 846-47.

Id at 856 n.5 (citing People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 505-06 (Cal. 2003); Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843 (2006) (No. 04-9728)).
'as
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
137
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III. SCHOOL SEARCHES: BACK TO THE FUTURE?

One of the most curious things about Redding is that the
words "special need" do not appear in any of the opinions. 139 In
contrast, those words appeared seven times in the majority
40 and another six times in Justice
opinion alone in Earls,1
141
Ginsburg's dissent. It seems unlikely that many commentators would have predicted prior to Redding that a school search
case would be decided without using the term "special needs."
Perhaps the term-and the exception-were not used because
the case simply required a straightforward application of the
seminal school search case, TL.O.,142 and a suspicionless
search was not involved.143 But the same could be said of
Knights, the case involving a search of a probationer's home
based on reasonable suspicion. 144 That case simply required a
straight forward application of a seminal probationer's search

Id.
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 827, 829, 835, 836 (2002).
141 Id. at 843, 844, 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens explained:
In New Jersey v. T.L.0, the Court established a two-step inquiry for determining the reasonableness of a school official's decision to search a student. First, the Court explained, the search must be '"justified at its inception"' by the presence of "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school." Second, the search must be "permissible in its
scope," which is achieved "when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."
Nothing the Court decides today alters this basic framework. It simply
applies TL. 0. to declare unconstitutional a strip search of a 13-year-old honors student that was based on a groundless suspicion that she might be hiding medicine in her underwear.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
143 Id. at 2637 (majority opinion) ("The issue here is whether a 13-year-old student's
Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra
and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought
forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school." (emphasis added)).
'"
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001) ("In this case, we decide
whether a search pursuant to this probation condition, and supported by reasonable
suspicion, satisfied the Fourth Amendment." (emphasis added)).
139
140
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case, Griffin v. Wisconsin,145 and a suspicionless search was not
involved.146 Yet the Court in Knights at least addressed the
special needs exception in order to eventually rule that it need
not be applied in the case.
Could it be that the special needs exception so obviously
does not apply in these situations that the parties do not even
raise it? The United States as amicus in Redding raised the
special needs exception for precisely that purpose, to distinguish the case from the special needs cases.147 The United
States argued that the special needs category applied only to
searches "undertaken pursuant to a general program," not to
targeted searches based on suspicion like the one at issue in
Redding.148 If that is true, and school searches can be analyzed
without resorting to the special needs exception, under what
analytical framework should they be analyzed? Perhaps the
best hint comes from Justice Thomas, the author of the majority opinion in Samson v. California, who insisted in that case
that the suspicionless search of a parolee could be decided un145
146

See id. at 118-19.
Id at 114.

147 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal [Brief for
United States] at 10-12, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009) (No. 08-479). The United States wrote:

This Court has recognized that the public school context is unique for
Fourth Amendment purposes....
The unique character of this context has resulted in two distinct Fourth
Amendment frameworks. One framework, developed in Vernonia and Earls,
applies to suspicionless searches that are conducted as part of a systematic
drug testing program. As to those searches, the requirement of individualized
suspicion is "impracticable" and therefore unnecessary; the Fourth Amendment inquiry instead turns on a balancing of the strength of the governmental interests furthered by the testing program against the intrusion on the
subject's legitimate expectation of privacy. That standard is inapplicable here
because the search of respondent was not undertaken pursuant to a general
program.
Because this case concerns a search based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing, it is governed by the separate framework set forth in New Jersey

v. T L.O.
Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-38 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1995)).
148 Id. at 11-12.
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der the Court's "general Fourth Amendment approach." 149 Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia recently have been advocating
that Fourth Amendment analysis should begin by determining
whether the search or seizure was legal or illegal under the
common law at the time the Amendment was drafted.1 50 Justice Scalia explained this approach in Wyoming v. Houghton, a
case involving the scope of the automobile exception. 15 ' Specifically, the issue was "whether police officers violate the Fourth
Amendment when they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband."152 In his majority opinion, Justice
Scalia began his analysis of the constitutionality of the search
by stating:
In determining whether a particular government action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the
action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under
the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where
that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or
seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which
it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.153
Under this approach, the balancing test as a means of determining the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search
or seizure takes a back seat to the common law at the time the
Amendment was adopted. 154 Taken seriously, that approach
would change dramatically the operation of the Fourth
149

547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).

See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
526 U.S. 295 (1999). In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia cited Justice
Thomas's majority opinion in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), which established that the "knock and announce" rule was of constitutional magnitude, based
largely on the conclusion that this was the recognized rule "at the time of the framing."
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934).
152 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297.
153 Id. at 299-300 (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931; California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 624 (1991); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)).
15 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300.
150
151
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Amendment in schools, essentially eliminating the current protections the Amendment provides. Justice Thomas was quite
clear about this in Redding.155 In his concurring and dissenting
opinion, he set forth what he seemingly envisions as a "general
Fourth Amendment approach" as it relates to school searches:
[T]he most constitutionally sound approach to the question of
applying the Fourth Amendment in local public schools would
in fact be the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis.

"[I]n the early years of public schooling," courts applied
the doctrine of in loco parentis to transfer to teachers the authority of a parent to "'command obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits."' So
empowered, schoolteachers and administrators had almost
complete discretion to establish and enforce the rules they believed were necessary to maintain control over their classrooms.156

And he was equally clear what this approach meant for the
search at issue in Redding.
If the common-law view that parents delegate to teachers
their authority to discipline and maintain order were to be
applied in this case, the search of Redding would stand. There
can be no doubt that a parent would have had the authority to
conduct the search at issue in this case. Parents have "immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment" when
it comes to searches of a child or that child's belongings. 157
In Justice Thomas's view, if parents and children want protection from rules or actions by school officials that they (and like-

155 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655-56 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("If the common-law
view that parents delegate to teachers their authority to discipline and maintain order
were to be applied in this case, the search of Redding would stand. . . . Parents have
'immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment' when it comes to searches of a
child or that child's belongings.").
156 Id. at 2655 (internal citations omitted).
157 Id. at 2656.
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ly others) consider unreasonable, they need to look elsewhere
than the Fourth Amendment for relief:
Restoring the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis
would not, however, leave public schools entirely free to impose any rule they choose. "If parents do not like the rules
imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in school
boards or legislatures; they can send their children to private
schools or home school them; or they can simply move."158
He expressed a similar view concerning the role of in loco parentis in determining the First Amendment rights of students
in Morse v. Frederick,159 the well-known "Bong Hits for Jesus"
case, where he also asserted, "At least nominally, this Court
has continued to recognize the applicability of the in loco parentis doctrine to public schools." 6 0
Of course, Justice Thomas stood alone in Redding and
Morse, so perhaps school children are still secure in at least
having some Fourth Amendment rights. But he is not alone in
championing a return to in loco parentis. Justice Scalia "revived" in loco parentisin his opinion in Vernonia,161 and Justice
158

Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., concur-

ring)).
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 416 n.6.
161 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995). In Vernonia, Justice Scalia wrote:
159
160

In TL.0. we rejected the notion that public schools, like private schools,
exercise only parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to constitutional constraints. Such a view of things, we said, "is not entirely 'consonant with compulsory education laws,"' and is inconsistent with
our prior decisions treating school officials as state actors for purposes of the
Due Process and Free Speech Clauses. But while denying that the State's
power over schoolchildren is formally no more than the delegated power of
their parents, TL.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of
that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and
control that could not be exercised over free adults. "[A] proper educational
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." While we do not, of course, suggest that public schools
as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise
to a constitutional "duty to protect," we have acknowledged that for many
purposes "school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis," with the power and indeed
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Breyer seemed warm to the idea in his concurring opinion in

Earls. 162

Following Vernonia, in loco parentis, although rejected in
TL.O., began creeping back into play. In an article published
shortly after Vernonia, Professor Martin Gardner, another participant in this symposium, quoted three other scholars to
make this suggestion:
Moreover, the Acton Court's recognition that "schoolmasters
stand in loco parentid' to their students at least for "many

purposes" signals that the Court is "struggling to empower
the duty to "inculcate the habits and manners of civility." Thus, while children assuredly do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
gate," the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.
Id. (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia carefully noted
that while T.L.0 officially renounced the applicability of in loco parentis in public
schools, the Court, only one year later, described the duties of public schools as remarkably similar to typical parental duties. Id. Thus, while not expressly challenging
T.L.O.'s assertion that in loco parentis is no longer appropriate in the public school
context, Justice Scalia suggested that the issue may be more complex; he suggested
that school officials may act in loco parentisin certain circumstances and may be traditional state actors in others. See id. By pointing out this potential ambiguity, Justice
Scalia has created an opportunity for a future partial reinstatement of in loco parentis.
162 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). Seven
years after Justice Scalia noted a possible opportunity for the partial restoration of in
loco parentis,Justice Breyer indicated modest support for such a move:
Today's public expects its schools not simply to teach the fundamentals, but
"to shoulder the burden of feeding students breakfast and lunch, offering before and after school child care services, and providing medical and psychological services," all in a school environment that is safe and encourages
learning. The law itself recognizes these responsibilities with the phrase in
loco parentis-a phrase that draws its legal force primarily from the needs of
younger students (who here are necessarily grouped together with older high
school students) and which reflects, not that a child or adolescent lacks an interest in privacy, but that a child's or adolescent's school-related privacy interest, when compared to the privacy interests of an adult, has different dimensions. A public school system that fails adequately to carry out its responsibilities may well see parents send their children to private or parochial
school instead-with help from the State.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Breyer justifies his support for a return to in
loco parentis by asserting that the doctrine means no more than that the Fourth
Amendment rights of children in public schools are different than the rights of adults,
or the rights of those same children outside the public school context. See id Arguably,
Justice Breyer slightly mischaracterizes the nature of in loco parentis, but, nonetheless, he demonstrates that he is certainly persuadable on the issue.
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school officials to effectively address rising threats to children" perhaps leading "down a path that promises to end the
Fourth Amendment rights of students in public schools." 163
Are we now heading down that path? Could a revival of in loco
parentis result in an end to the Fourth Amendment rights of
students in public schools? A few recent cases suggest it is a
possibility and, at a minimum, demonstrate that the views of
the few justices who have suggested in loco parentisstill plays
a role in school cases are influencing lower courts perhaps more
than they should.
In Lopera v. Town of Coventry, a visiting boys soccer team
was accused by football players of stealing iPods and cell
phones from the locker room where several of the visiting players had used the bathroom prior to the game. 164 In response to
these allegations made following the game, the coach of the
visiting team searched the bags of the players and found no
stolen items, but this failed to satisfy the football players or the
adults and athletic director who had joined them at the visiting
team's bus.165 As the coach discussed the situation with the
athletic director, four police officers arrived with sirens activated and "boxed in" the bus.1 66 To appease the officers and the
crowd, the coach "consented" to a search of his players' bags by
the officers. A thorough search failed to turn up any of the
missing items. 167
163 Martin R. Gardner, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools: Observations on an Unsettled State of Search and Seizure Law, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 373, 385
(2000) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995); Bill
O'Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 71, 113; Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Michael O'Brien, Drug Testing of
Students in Public Schools: Implications ofVernonia School District v. Acton for other
Types ofSchool-Related DrugSearches, 113 EDUC. L. REP. 521, 538 (1996)).
164 652 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.R.I. 2009). Apparently, while inside, one of the visiting players noticed a security guard keeping an eye on them. Id.
165 Id. ("When Coach Marchand exited the bus, the original group of twenty football
players had grown to about fifty or sixty students and adults. The Coventry Athletic
Director was also waiting. According to Coach Marchand, at this point the crowd was
extremely vocal, shouting derogatory and racist remarks at his team and threatening
not to disperse until the missing items were found.").
166 Id. at 210.
167

Id.
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Later, members of the soccer team filed suit alleging, in
part, that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches.168 Defendants conceded
that no reasonable suspicion existed to justify the searches, but
argued no constitutional violation occurred because the coach
69 They claimed qualiconsented to the search in loco parentis.1
fied immunity and argued that it was reasonable for the officers on the scene to believe the coach, acting in loco parentis
over the players, had at least apparent authority to consent to
a search.170 The plaintiffs responded that it was well settled
that the in loco parentis doctrine cannot justify the search of a
student171 They acknowledged that at one time the law considered school officials as acting broadly in loco parentis,but argued that notion had become seriously outdated over the previous thirty years.172
The district court responded to the plaintiffs' argument by
conceding that "[i]n T.L.O., the Supreme Court appeared to
soundly reject the doctrine of in loco parentis as a rationale to
justify a search of a student,"173 but explained that the Supreme Court later added confusion when, in Vernonia, it "referred to the powers school officials have over students as custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults."174 And the
district court cited Redding to note, "Recently, the Supreme
Court passed up an opportunity to clarify whether the in loco
parentis doctrine has any significance in school search cases."'7 5 The district court found it meaningful, however, that
168
169

170
171

Id.at 209, 211.
Id at 212.
Idat 212-13.
Id at 213.

172 Id
173 Id ("'In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such
policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for
the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment."' (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985))).
174Id at 213-14 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995)).
175 Id at 214 (quoting Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633,
2637 (2009)).
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Justice Thomas had urged the Supreme Court to adopt in loco
parentis as the standard to govern all school search cases, but
that the majority declined to address his suggestion.176 That led
the district court to conclude that, "[i]n light of the Supreme
Court's silence on the issue and the rather clear language of
TL.0., a persuasive argument could be made that the in loco
parentis doctrine serves no purpose in cases involving the
Fourth Amendment rights of public school students."177
Nevertheless, the court pointed to Justice Thomas's
statement in Morse v. Frederick that "at least nominally the
Supreme Court continues to recognize the applicability of the
in loco parentis doctrine to public schools"178 to ultimately rule
that "based on the full record of commentary on the issue, this
Court cannot conclude that [the notion that in loco parentis is
outdated] was a clearly established principle of constitutional
law in 2006."179 The district court said that such a conclusion
was "not possible without ignoring the Supreme Court's statements in Vernonia and Frasier[sic]," 180 and explained that a
81
review of circuit court cases also failed to clarify the issue.1
176 Id. at 214 n.6 ("Justice Thomas's partial dissent urged the Court to adopt an in
loco parentis standard to govern all school search cases, a point the majority declined
to address."). The district court also noted that Justice Thomas "advocatfed] for a 'return to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentid and a 'complete restoration' of the
doctrine." Id. at 214 n.6 (quoting Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2646, 2655 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).

177 Id. at 214.

178Id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 n.6 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
179 Id. at 214.
1so Id. This reference to Frasier[sic] was to Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,

which the Vernonia Court quoted for the proposition that "for many purposes school
authorities act in loco parentiswith the power and indeed the duty to inculcate the
habits and manners of civility." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 684 (1986) (citation omitted)).
181Lopera, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 214. The district court cited nine cases from six different circuits offering some level of support for the viability of the in loco parentis
doctrine. Id. at 214-15 (citing cases from the Fifth, Second, Third, First, Sixth, and
Fourth Circuits). The Court contrasted this with a citation to a case from the Second
Circuit stating that '"the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that public schools
generally act in loco parentis in their dealings with students."' Id. at 215 (quoting Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 n.9 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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According to the district court, "Courts have bandied about the
phrase to such an extent that it is far from clear exactly what
role the in loco parentisdoctrine plays in a Fourth Amendment
analysis, particularly in the specific factual context presented
here." 182 In the end, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.183 The court carefully explained in a footnote that it was
not holding that the coach had the authority to consent by virtue of in loco parentis authority, but instead that "the case law
on the limits of a school official's in loco parentis authority in
the specific factual context of this case is not sufficiently clear
so that a reasonable police officer would be on notice that
searching players based on the consent of their coach is unconstitutional."184 The district court further concluded that
"[w]hat is clear, however, is that Fourth Amendment rights 'are
different in public schools than elsewhere; [and] the "reasonableness" inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children."'185
The result in Lopera suggests that at some level in loco
parentis has vitality in the school search setting to justify
searches (or at least grant qualified immunity to officials carrying out searches) that otherwise might be found unconstitutional. The possibility of additional searches being upheld as
constitutional will be amplified if courts stop utilizing the special needs exception. This is so because despite early criticism
that the special needs exception opened the door to searches
being found constitutional, it now appears the special needs
exception, in contrast to the Court's "general Fourth AmendId at 215.
183 Id. ("[]t cannot be said that the law in 2006 was clearly established concerning
182

whether a high school coach chaperoning his players during an away game could or
could not consent to a search of his players by police in loco parentis. What is clear,
however, is that Fourth Amendment rights 'are different in public schools than elsewhere; [and] the "reasonableness" inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children.' Therefore, because the law was not clearly established concerning Coach Marchand's authority to consent to the search, the Defendant
officers were entitled to rely on the consent." (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia,
515 U.S. at 656)).
184 Id. at 215 n.7.
1s5 Id at 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
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ment approach," has a limiting effect on the range of government conduct justified under the Fourth Amendment.
An example of how application of the special needs exception can constrain a court from upholding a search is Spencer v.
City of Bay City.'8 6 Spencer was a challenge to the constitutionality of a Bay City, Michigan ordinance that allowed police
officers with reasonable suspicion to demand a breath test from
individuals under age twenty-one without obtaining a search
warrant. 8 7 The City defended the ordinance by asserting the
special needs exception, contending that the main purposes of
the ordinance were "to stem the pernicious trend of increased
under-age drinking, and to protect the public from the damage
that can be caused by young people under the influence of alcohol."188 The district court agreed that a strong interest existed
in preventing "'harms associated with the use of alcohol by persons lacking the maturity necessary to do so responsibly' and
'to reduce underage drinking and, by extension, the fatalities
and serious injuries caused by teenage drunk driving,"1 89 but
rejected the City's argument that the search was lawful under
the special needs exception because it determined that the
primary purpose of the search was to gather evidence to enforce criminal laws.190

292 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Id. at 934.
188 Id at 941.
186

187

189

Id. (quoting State v. Stark (In re Stark), 645 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Mich. Ct. App.

2002)).
190 Id. at 941-42. To reach this conclusion, the district court compared the ordinance
to Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), and the municipal hospital's

practice of conducting drug tests on urine samples of pregnant women at issue in that
case. Id. at 942. In Ferguson, the hospital conducted the testing in an effort to identify
pregnant women using illegal drugs and provide them with substance abuse treatment;

however, the hospital also turned the results over to the police. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at
82. The Supreme Court determined that the primary purpose of the drug testing was

ordinary law enforcement; thus, despite its additional acceptable purpose (identifying
pregnant women in need of substance abuse treatment), the testing violated the Fourth
Amendment and was not saved by the special needs exception. Id. at 82-84. In making
its comparison, the Spencer Court explained that, "[even though] there may also be
another purpose behind the law [reducing under-age drinking], which might be characterized as a 'special need,' [that purpose] does not shelter the ordinance from demands
of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." Spencer, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 941-42.
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Arguably, had the Court been free to apply an "ordinary
Fourth Amendment approach," it might have found that the
significant government interest it was willing to recognizethat of preventing "harms associated with the use of alcohol by
persons lacking the maturity necessary to do so responsibly"
and "reduc[ing] underage drinking and, by extension, the fatalities and serious injuries caused by teenage drunk driving"191 outweighed the intrusion on underage individuals under the
statutory scheme. But the court felt constrained under the special needs exception precedent (in particular Ferguson v. City
of Charleston)to find the scheme unconstitutional. 192
Confusion about the Supreme Court's approach to suspicionless searches-whether to apply special needs analysis or
general Fourth Amendment analysis-is also evident in the
DNA sample cases. Courts are so confused about which test to
apply that some are applying both. A recent example is Friedman v. Boucher,193 a case in which a DNA swab was taken from
a pretrial detainee in hopes of solving a cold case. 194 The detainee was a prior sex offender, but at the time of the pretrial detention in question on unrelated charges, he was under no restrictions or conditions from his prior sex offense conviction. 95
He brought suit alleging the forcible taking of his DNA violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.196 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government officials on the basis of qualified immunity. 197
The Ninth Circuit held the dismissal of the lawsuit was
improper, ruling that the suspicionless search of the detainee
could not be upheld under the special needs exception because

Spencer, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (quoting Stark, 645 N.W.2d at 342).
See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
193 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009).
194 Id. at 850-51. Taking the swab apparently did not result in the detainee being
implicated in any cold case. Id. at 851-52.
191

192

Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
197 Id. at 851.
195
196
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the purpose was "law enforcement."1 98 Although in the majority's view the search was improper under the special needs exception due to its law enforcement purpose, the majority addressed the possibility that the search might be justified under
the general Fourth Amendment approach, ultimately rejecting
that argument as well because it determined the Samson case
could not be used as precedent to uphold a search of a pretrial
detainee rather than a parolee.199
The dissenting judge would have affirmed the district
court and dismissed the case by finding qualified immunity
utilizing a "general Fourth Amendment approach." 200 Under
that approach, the law enforcement purpose did not prevent
the search from being lawful, and the lower expectation of privacy of a pretrial detainee meant the search was (at least arguably) permissible under the balancing test or totality of the
circumstances test. 201
The result reached by the dissent suggests a scenario
where a search that is unconstitutional under the special needs
exception is nevertheless permissible under general Fourth
Amendment analysis. That seems backwards. The Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence began with the Court trying to
determine which searches that would be unconstitutional under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis (the warrant approach) might nevertheless be permissible because they came
within a closely guarded category (including special needs) allowing the Court to forgive the usual requirement of individualized suspicion. 202 Now, we seem to be in a strange place where
"98 Id. at 853 ("The 'special needs' exception is limited to 'important non-law enforcement purposes.' The only government interest asserted by Nevada in taking
Friedman's DNA was to help solve 'cold cases.' Solving crimes is clearly a normal law
enforcement function. Because the 'special needs' exception applies only to non-law
enforcement purposes, and the State's interest here is the use of data for purely law
enforcement purposes, the 'special needs' exception is inapplicable." (quoting United
States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004))).
199 Id. at 857-58.
200 Id. at 862, 866 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 864-65.
202 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) ("[I]t is settled.
. . that
except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
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the special needs exception has the opposite effect: being within
the special needs exception may prevent a search from being
upheld rather than having its original effect of permitting the
Court to find an otherwise impermissible search justified.
IV. WHERE ARE WE NOW?
The Court needs to delineate when it is appropriate to
simply use "general Fourth Amendment" analysis to analyze
suspicionless search cases and to clarify the reach of the special
needs exception and the necessity of finding a special need (or
other limited circumstance) to justify a suspicionless search.
Guidance as to exactly what "general Fourth Amendment"
analysis constitutes also would be helpful. 203 The door appears
to be open to finding the school setting no longer demands the
application of the special needs exception, but permits suspicionless searches by school officials to be upheld under the
Court's new "general Fourth Amendment approach." 204 That, in
turn, frees the Court from some of the limits of that exceprant.... In particular, a warrant requirement is not appropriate when the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.
Or . . . [o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable." (internal citations omitted)); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or
seizure .. . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant
issued upon probable cause. . . . When faced with . . . special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the
warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context."); Nat'l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) ("[A] search must be supported,
as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause . . . . [Where a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.").
203 The only guidance the Court has offered so far has been to equate "general
Fourth Amendment" analysis with the totality of the circumstances test. For a discussion of the inappropriateness of using the totality of the circumstances test in this
setting, see United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 862 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhart, J.,
dissenting).
204 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing that the special needs
exception may only apply to suspicionless searches conducted pursuant to a general
program and not to TL.O.-type searches based on individualized suspicion).
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tion-e.g. the primary purpose test 205 and demonstrating a significant need 206-and may lead to suspicionless searches that
currently may seem impermissible being upheld as constitutional.
Civil libertarians used to, and still do, lament the "standardlessness" of the special needs exception 20 7 and the lack of
protection it provides. 208 Few would have speculated that the
exception would ultimately protect us from something worse.
This article suggests the special needs exception may have a
second career as a constraint on government actions that implicate the Fourth Amendment. More likely, however, the exception will fade in importance as government activity that
constitutes a search is upheld under the standardless and
amorphous "general Fourth Amendment analysis." It will not

205 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S 32, 48 (2000) (holding that because a
checkpoint program's primary purpose was "indistinguishable from the general interest
in crime control," the checkpoints constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
206 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (explaining that the warrant and probable cause
requirements can be excused as long as there is a showing of special governmental
needs beyond the normal needs of law enforcement).
207 See, e.g, Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs

Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court
Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102, 109 (2005) ("When considered as a whole . . . the
Court's special needs cases do not provide an overarching theory that clearly identifies
which searches will satisfy the Court's constitutional scrutiny."); George M. Dery III,

Are PoliticiansMore Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren?How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment 'Special Needs" Balancing,40 ARIZ.
L. REv. 73, 74 (1998) ("[In the surreal world of special needs, any fact can be twisted to
fit the desired result without regard for Fourth Amendment mainstays."); Michael S.

Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "SpecialNeeds" in Criminal Justice: An Evolving
Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 220 (1993) ("The 'special needs' exception is virtually
without standards, hence lower courts can fashion an endless stream of exceptions
under the guise of 'special needs."').
208 See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "SpecialNeeds" and the Fourth Amend-

ment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 529, 531 (1997) ("The special needs rationale is making it remarkably easy
for the state to bypass the rigorous requirements of a warrant and probable cause in a
large and growing number of contexts."); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale:

Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 90
(1992) ("[U]nless the Supreme Court realigns its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
parallel the historical intent of the Fourth Amendment, citizens' Fourth Amendment
privacy protections will be subject to methodical erosion.").
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be surprising to discover that all of us, not just school children
and parolees, are not so special anymore.
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